Against pragmatism: on efficacy, effectiveness and the real world by Kent, David M & Kitsios, Georgios
BioMed  Central
Page 1 of 3
(page number not for citation purposes)
Trials
Open Access Commentary
Against pragmatism: on efficacy, effectiveness and the real world
David M Kent* and Georgios Kitsios
Address: Institute for Clinical Research and Health Policy Studies and Department of Medicine, Tufts Medical Center, Tufts University School of 
Medicine, Boston, USA
Email: David M Kent* - dkent1@tuftsmedicalcenter.org; Georgios Kitsios - gkitsios@tuftsmedicalcenter.org
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
Explanatory and pragmatic trials represent ends of a continuum of attitudes about clinical trial
design. Recent literature argues that pragmatic trials are more informative about clinical care in the
real world. Although there is place for more pragmatic studies to inform clinical practice and health
policy decision-making, we are concerned that it is generally under-appreciated that extrapolating
the results of broadly inclusive pragmatic trials to the care of real patients may often be as
problematic as extrapolating the results of narrowly focused explanatory or efficacy trials.
Simplistic interpretation of pragmatic trials runs the risk of driving harmful policies.
Background
Determining the 'true' treatment effect of a given therapy
is a bit like determining the 'true' weight of a liter of water.
Those who answer that a liter of water weighs a kilogram
are either assuming an implicit 'on planet earth, at sea
level, at four degrees Celsius' or confusing the intrinsic
property of mass with the extrinsic property of weight.
Like weight, treatment effect is an extrinsic property,
emerging only through an interaction between the inter-
vention, the patient, and the circumstances in which it is
being measured [1]. Adjust the context and a different
effect emerges – just as a liter of water weighs a little over
a third of a kilogram on Mars.
Treweek and Zwarenstein present a narrative review on
pragmatic trials highlighting the importance of consider-
ing the context of a trial when interpreting its result [2].
Efficacy (or 'explanatory') trials, they argue, with their
emphasis on ideal patients in ideal settings, may not gen-
eralize to routine care and are therefore not especially
informative regarding practical clinical and policy deci-
sions. What is needed, they assert, is a more pragmatic
attitude toward trial design, such that trials include all
patients who might be considered for a therapy in the real
world, so that the trial result can be applicable to practical
decisions. Framed in this way, who can argue that trials
should not be more pragmatic? Indeed, the argument has
been gaining momentum, and we see a welcome shift to
a more pragmatic attitude [3,4]. Yet, on the cusp of the era
of comparative effectiveness, it is essential that we exam-
ine critically the ability of pragmatic trials to make up for
this well-appreciated limitation of efficacy trials and pro-
vide information directly applicable to the real world.
Discussion
First, let us recognize that if the purpose of a trial is to
examine whether a treatment for a given condition works
at all or not (perhaps the most common reason for a trial),
then designing a trial toward the explanatory/efficacy end
of the continuum is probably a wise decision. The US
Food and Drug Administration guidance on this gets to
the heart of the issue – a trial may yield null results for a
myriad of reasons [5]: the therapy may just not work, or
the therapy may work in more carefully diagnosed
Published: 6 July 2009
Trials 2009, 10:48 doi:10.1186/1745-6215-10-48
Received: 1 June 2009
Accepted: 6 July 2009
This article is available from: http://www.trialsjournal.com/content/10/1/48
© 2009 Kent and Kitsios; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Trials 2009, 10:48 http://www.trialsjournal.com/content/10/1/48
Page 2 of 3
(page number not for citation purposes)
patients, or those better selected in terms of disease sever-
ity, or in those with less co-morbidities or better compli-
ance, or with closer monitoring, or in settings with a
higher commitment to and/or more experience with the
intervention. The therapy may even work in the enrolled
patients in the trial setting, but measurement error
obscured the treatment signal or inadequate sample size
drowned it in statistical noise. Thus, a null pragmatic trial
provides little information about whether our treatment
has some potential value. On the other hand, a null effi-
cacy trial, performed under the most favorable possible
circumstances, can give us definitive information that a
therapy is not of value.
Treweek and Zwarenstein concede that proof of efficacy
may be an important pre-requisite for an effectiveness
trial [2]. The question then becomes how does one inter-
pret the results of a pragmatic trial in the context of a pre-
viously favorable efficacy trial? If only pragmatic trials
have implications for 'real world' settings, as the authors
suggest, then the results of these trials presumably trump
or nullify the results of efficacy trials. Thus, if a broadly
inclusive effectiveness trial yields null results, policy deci-
sions should reflect the fact that the treatment does not
work in the real world, even when efficacy was demon-
strated in a more 'explanatory' trial. Another view, the
view that we hold, is that when effectiveness and efficacy
trials yield discordant results, the therapy works in some
situations and not in others. Physician judgment is then
necessary to make treatment decisions based on the
degree to which specific patients and settings in the real
world correspond to those in the efficacy trial. Indeed, this
is not so terribly different from what we might have rec-
ommended before the pragmatic trial; the negative effec-
tiveness trial provides important information about how
cautious physicians need to be in generalizing the efficacy
results.
So, if null efficacy trials are more informative than null
effectiveness trials, surely positive pragmatic effectiveness
trials must be more informative than positive efficacy tri-
als? However, consider also the potential of positive prag-
matic trials to elevate low-value or even harmful care to
the status of evidence-based medicine. A broadly inclusive
trial is likely to include many patient groups where there
is little likelihood of any benefit. For example, we would
not be at all persuaded to add a new oral hypoglycemic to
the standard regimen in an 85-year-old woman with
recent onset diabetes, Class II heart failure and a glycated
hemoglobin of 8, who is on five other medications, even
if the patient meets the inclusion criteria of a well-con-
ducted effectiveness trial which showed overall benefit –
simply because the potential for benefit is too small to
warrant the risks of polypharmacy. Similarly, for any treat-
ment with a narrow therapeutic index, we would with-
hold therapy from patients highly likely to be poorly
adherent, even if such patients were included in a positive
pragmatic trial.
The issues of extrapolating trial results to patients are still
more complex than in these relatively straightforward
examples, since heterogeneity of baseline risk can result in
situations in which the average result of a trial may be mis-
leading even about the typical patient in the trial itself
[6,7]. Unless accompanied by more careful analytic
approaches [7-10], broadly inclusive pragmatic trials
(which increase the baseline heterogeneity of outcome
risk, competing risk, and risk of treatment-related harm)
have the potential to exacerbate, rather than reduce, the
difficulty of applying clinical trial results to individual
patients [11].
The last point we wish to make concerns the increased
attention with which care is delivered in the context of a
trial. Finding a signal of efficacy can be difficult and addi-
tional resources are often used to ensure that performance
of therapeutic procedures or adherence to a medical regi-
men is especially meticulous. Unfortunately, helping
patients in the real world is also often difficult and fre-
quently requires meticulous care, and some new therapies
may require substantial organizational or structural
changes to be effective. While ultra-meticulous care in tri-
als can give misleading results (that are potentially harm-
ful to patients if generalized to inappropriate settings),
'pragmatically' testing such new therapies in resource-
challenged environments may often be a recipe – or an
excuse – for inertia; it sets so-called 'usual care', rather
than the 'best attainable and sustainable' care [12], as the
aspirational standard.
Conclusion
This is a very partial account of the limitations of prag-
matic trials. More issues will undoubtedly be revealed as
the pendulum swings in the pragmatic direction and we
gain more experience with this type of trial. The main
point we wish to emphasize is that while both types of tri-
als yield useful information, pragmatic trials do not pro-
vide a more accurate measure of the 'true' treatment effect,
since the concept of a true effect is fundamentally illusory.
While extrapolating the results of efficacy trials to the care
of individual patients in the real world can be problem-
atic, and requires careful physician judgment and deci-
sion-making, the same is unfortunately true for the results
of effectiveness trials. Unless more attention is paid to
these under-appreciated limitations, pragmatic trials run
the risk of driving harmful policies.
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